Featured "Distinguished Impersonator" Information Operation That
Previously Impersonated U.S. Politicians and Journalists on Social Media
Leverages Fabricated U.S. Liberal Personas to Promote Iranian Interests

Published on February 15th, 2023 📆 | 7849 Views ⚑

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“Distinguished Impersonator” Information Operation That Previously Impersonated U.S. Politicians and Journalists on Social Media Leverages Fabricated U.S. Liberal Personas to Promote Iranian Interests


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In May 2019, FireEye Threat Intelligence published a blog post
exposing a network of English-language social media accounts that
engaged in inauthentic
behavior and misrepresentation
that we assessed with low
confidence was organized in support of Iranian political interests.
Personas in that network impersonated candidates for U.S. House of
Representatives seats in 2018 and leveraged fabricated journalist
personas to solicit various individuals, including real journalists
and politicians, for interviews intended to bolster desired political
narratives. Since the release of that blog post, we have continued to
track activity that we believe to be part of that broader operation,
reporting our findings to our intelligence customers using the moniker
“Distinguished Impersonator.”

Today, Facebook took
action against a set of eleven accounts
on the Facebook and
Instagram platforms that they shared with us and, upon our independent
review, we assessed were related to the broader Distinguished
Impersonator activity set we’ve been tracking. We separately
identified a larger set of just under 40 related accounts active on
Twitter against which Twitter has also taken recent enforcement
action. In this blog post, we provide insights into the recent
activity and behavior of some of the personas in the Distinguished
Impersonator network, in order to exemplify the tactics information
operations actors are employing in their attempts to surreptitiously
amplify narratives and shape political attitudes.          

Activity Overview

Personas in the Distinguished Impersonator network have continued to
engage in activity similar to that we previously reported on publicly
in May 2019, including social media messaging directed at politicians
and media outlets; soliciting prominent individuals including
academics, journalists, and activists for “media” interviews; and
posting what appear to be videoclips of interviews of unknown
provenance conducted with such individuals to social media. The
network has also leveraged authentic media content to promote desired
political narratives, including the dissemination of news articles and
videoclips from Western mainstream media outlets that happen to align
with Iranian interests, and has amplified the commentary of real
individuals on social media.

Outside of impersonating prominent individuals such as journalists,
other personas in the network have primarily posed as U.S. liberals,
amplifying authentic content from other social media users broadly in
line with that proclaimed political leaning, as well as material more
directly in line with Iranian political interests, such as videoclips
of a friendly meeting between U.S. President Trump and Crown Prince of
Saudi Arabia Mohammad Bin Salman accompanied by pro-U.S. Democrat
commentary, videoclips of U.S. Democratic presidential candidates
discussing Saudi Arabia's role in the conflict in Yemen, and other
anti-Saudi, anti-Israeli, and anti-Trump messaging. Some of this
messaging has been directed at the social media accounts of U.S.
politicians and media outlets (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Twitter accounts in the
Distinguished Impersonator network posting anti-Israeli, anti-Saudi,
and anti-Trump content

We observed direct overlap between six of the personas operating on
Facebook platforms and those operating on Twitter. In one example of
such overlap, the “Ryan Jensen” persona posted to both Twitter and
Instagram a videoclip showing antiwar protests in the U.S. following
the killing of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps’ Quds Force (IRGC-QF) by a U.S. airstrike in Baghdad in
January 2020 (Figure 2). Notably, though the strike motivated some
limited activity by personas in the network, the Distinguished
Impersonator operation has been active since long before that incident.



Figure 2: Posts by the “Ryan Jensen”
persona on Twitter and Instagram disseminating a videoclip of
antiwar protests in the U.S. following the killing of Qasem Soleimani

Accounts Engaged in Concerted Replies to Influential Individuals on
Twitter, Posed as Journalists and Solicited Prominent Individuals for
“Media” Interviews

Personas on Twitter that we assess to be a part of the Distinguished
Impersonator operation engaged in concerted replies to tweets by
influential individuals and organizations, including members of the
U.S. Congress and other prominent political figures, journalists, and
media outlets. The personas responded to tweets with specific
narratives aligned with Iranian interests, often using identical
hashtags. The personas sometimes also responded with content unrelated
to the tweet they were replying to, again with messaging aligned with
Iranian interests. For example, a tweet regarding a NASA mission
received replies from personas in the network pertaining to Iran’s
seizure of a British oil tanker in July 2019. Other topics the
personas addressed included U.S.-imposed sanctions on Iran and U.S.
President Trump’s impeachment (Figure 3). While it is possible that
the personas may have conducted such activity in the hope of eliciting
responses from the specific individuals and organizations they were
replying to, the multiple instances of personas responding to
seemingly random tweets with unrelated political content could also
indicate an intent to reach the broader Twitter audiences following
those prominent accounts.



Figure 3: Twitter accounts addressing
U.S.-imposed sanctions on Iran (left) and the Trump impeachment (right)

Instagram accounts that we assess to be part of the Distinguished
Impersonator operation subsequently highlighted this Twitter activity
by posting screen recordings of an unknown individual(s) scrolling
through the responses by the personas and authentic Twitter users to
prominent figures’ tweets. The Instagram account @ryanjensen7722, for
example, posted a video scrolling through replies to a tweet by U.S.
Senator Cory Gardner commenting on “censorship and oppression.” The
video included a reply posted by @EmilyAn1996, a Twitter account we
have assessed to be part of the operation, discussing potential
evidence surrounding President Trump’s impeachment trial.







Figure 4: Screenshot of video posted by
@ryanjensen7722 on Instagram scrolling through Twitter replies to a
tweet by U.S. Senator Cory Gardner

We also observed at least two personas posing as journalists working
at legitimate U.S. media outlets openly solicit prominent individuals
via Twitter, including Western academics, activists, journalists, and
political advisors, for interviews (Figure 5). These individuals
included academic figures from organizations such as the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy and the Foreign Policy Research
Institute, as well as well-known U.S. conservatives opposed to U.S.
President Trump and a British MP. The personas solicited the
individuals’ opinions regarding topics relevant to Iran’s political
interests, such as Trump’s 2020 presidential campaign, the Trump
administration’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, Trump’s “deal of the
century,” referring to a peace proposal regarding the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict authored by the Trump administration, and
a tweet by President Trump regarding former UK Prime Minister Theresa May.



Figure 5: The “James Walker” persona
openly soliciting interviews from academics and journalists on Twitter

Twitter Personas Posted Opinion Polls To Solicit Views on Topics
Relevant to Iranian Political Interests

Some of the personas on Twitter also posted opinion polls to solicit
other users’ views on political topics, possibly for the purpose of
helping to build a larger follower base through engagement. One
account, @CavenessJim, posed the question: “Do you believe in Trump’s
foreign policies especially what he wants to do for Israel which is
called ‘the deal of the century’?” (The poll provided two options:
“Yes, I do.” and “No, he cares about himself.” Of the 2,241 votes
received, 99% of participants voted for the latter option, though we
note that we have no visibility into the authenticity of those
“voters”.) Another account, @AshleyJones524, responded to a tweet by
U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham by posting a poll asking if the senator
was “Trump’s lapdog,” tagging seven prominent U.S. politicians and one
comedian in the post; all 24 respondents to the poll voted in the
affirmative. As with the Instagram accounts’ showcasing of replies to
the tweets of prominent individuals, Instagram accounts in the network
also highlighted polls posted by the personas on Twitter (Figure 6).



Figure 6: Twitter account @CavenessJim
posts Twitter poll (left); Instagram account @ryanjensen7722 posts
video highlighting @CavenessJim's Twitter poll (right)

Videoclips of Interviews with U.S., U.K., and Israeli Individuals
Posted on Iran-Based Media Outlet Tehran Times

Similar to the personas we reported on in May 2019, some of the more
recently active personas posted videoclips on Facebook, Instagram, and
Twitter of interviews with U.S., UK, and Israeli individuals including
professors, politicians, and activists expressing views on topics
aligned with Iranian political interests (Figure 7). We have thus far
been unable to determine the provenance of these interviews, and note
that, unlike some of the previous cases we reported on in 2019, the
personas in this more recent iteration of activity did not themselves
proclaim to have conducted the interviews they promoted on social
media. The videoclips highlighted the interviewees’ views on issues
such as U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and U.S. relations with
its political allies. Notably, we observed that at least some of the
videoclips that were posted by the personas to social media have also
appeared on the website of the Iranian English-language media outlet
Tehran Times, both prior to and following the personas'
social media posts. In other instances, Tehran Times published
videoclips that appeared to be different segments of the same
interviews that were posted by Distinguished Impersonator personas.
Tehran Times is owned by the Islamic Propagation
Organization, an entity that falls under the supervision of the
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.



Figure 7: Facebook and Instagram accounts
in the network posting videoclips of interviews with an activist and
a professor

Conclusion

The activity we’ve detailed here does not, in our assessment,
constitute a new activity set, but rather a continuation of an ongoing
operation we believe is being conducted in support of Iranian
political interests that we’ve been tracking since last year. It
illustrates that the actors behind this operation continue to explore
elaborate methods for leveraging the authentic political commentary of
real individuals to furtively promote Iranian political interests
online. The continued impersonation of journalists and the
amplification of politically-themed interviews of prominent
individuals also provide additional examples of what we have long
referred to internally as the “media-IO nexus”, whereby actors
engaging in online information operations actively leverage the
credibility of the legitimate media environment to mask their
activities, whether that be through the use of inauthentic
news sites masquerading as legitimate media entities
, deceiving
legitimate
media entities in order to promote desired political narratives
,
defacing media outlets’ websites to disseminate disinformation,
spoofing legitimate media websites, or, as in this case, attempting to
solicit commentary likely perceived as expedient to the actors’
political goals by adopting fake media personas.

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